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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH.

Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

Gase No.
11903

STANLEY WAYNE BARAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant, Stanley Wayne
of robbery in violation of Utah
( 1953), before the Third District
County, Honorable Gordon R. Hall,

Baran, was convicted
Code Ann. § 76-38-4
Court for Salt Lake
presiding.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'Dhe defendant-appellant was tried by a jury, found
guilty and sentenced for committing the crime of robbery.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the District
Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts
set forth in Appellant's Brief (at ____ ), and therefore sets
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forth its own statement as follows :
On January 10, 1969, through a prearranged plan to
commilt a robbery, (T. 126) Mr. Gerald Rose picked up
Mr. Brfan Frazier and Mr. Stanley Wayne Baran (T. 125).
The three stopped at a Beeline Station for gas ( T. 56) and
went out looking for a car to steal (T. 136). Before finding a car to steal, the three aJttempted several robberies,
but none worked out (T. 136). The defendant and his two
companions then stole Mr. Steve Parker's 1963 Ford (T.
48), drove out to the same Beeline Station, broke a window
and stole a transistor radio (T. 144).
Shortly before 10 :00 p.m. the three decided to rob
Smith's Independent Gas Station (T. 166). Mr. Baran,
itJhe appellant, had worked at the gas station before ( T.
60) ,.so Frazier and Rose went in fiirst (T. 166), Frazier with
a gun, and Rose IWilth a Iug wrench, and forced the station
a1Jtendant and his two friends to lay on their stomachs in
ithe back room (T. 31). Baran then came :in and took the
money from the cash register ( T. 117) whi'le Frazier took
the aJttendant and his friends' wallets (T. 31). Then the
three men fled. Baran knew hOlw to work the closed cash
regi'Ster because he had worked there (T. 61).
The three robbers went to Mr. Rose's house (T. 118)
and gave Rose his share of fue robbery money and asked
ih:im to hide the wallets (T. 87, 70, 71). Mr. Rose refu&ed
.the wiallets, whereupon someone, wccording to Mrs. Rose's
testimony, left the house and headed for the trailer (T.
71). Later the poilice recovered the wallets in Mr. Rose's
trailer (T. 100).
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The appellant took the sit.and in
own defense and
ciaimed he could not have committed 1Jhe robbery because
he wa.s at Lita Vilet's house wi'th her mother and fa11Jher
(T. 197). However, Mrs. Rose testified th.art; Baran, along
with Rose and Frazier, came to her house that Illight wit!h
the robbery money and the stolen wallets (T. 71, 72), and
Paul Rogers, a Salt Lake City policeman, testified that Mr.
Baran was in the Salt Lake P<Ylice Station talking with
him when appellant was isupposed !to be over at Lita Vilet's
house (T. 223). To further substanrtiate this, Mr. Rogers
personally typed a report of the conversation, stating tin
the report the time and the date of the conversaJtJion (T.
226).
Miss Carmelita Burke also testified in court that appellant told her a couple of days after the robbery ithaJt Brian
was the man \V'ith the gun and that he, Baran, also parlicipated in the robbery (T. 229).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF GUILT
IS SUPPORTED BY THE ACCOMPLICE'S TESTIMONY AND IS CORROBORATED WITH
SUBSTANTIAL INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE.
The first point raised by appellant iis that there iis Il'O
eviidence connecting him wi'bh ,the robbery, other than an
accomplice's statement. Appellant contends ,that under
Uta;h Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953) conviction cannot be
had on testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated
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by other evidence, and since there is supposedly no other
evidence, the conviction was not warranted.
Section 77-31-18 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953) 1·eads:
"A conviction shall not be had on the testimony
of ·an accomplice, un less he is corroborated by other
evidence, Which in itself and without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense; and
the corroboration shall nat be sufficient, lif it merely
shows the commission of the offense ·or the circumstances thereof."
1

In order to help interpret this statute, Utah judges
have adopted some tests which have been used as guidelines in ruling on the statute. In State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah
2d 162, 389 P. 2d 465 ( 1964) the court found the test

to be:
"Test of corroboration of accomplice is whether
there is evidence, independent of accomplice's testimony, which jury could reasonably believe tends to
and connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." Id. at 468.
The cour.t also sarid :
"In determining corroboration of accomplice;
corrobo:mJtive evidence should be looked at separate
and apart from his testimony to determine whether
there is some independent evidence tending .to connect defendant w1ith crime, but corroborative evidence should be considered in relation 'to other facts
shown." Id. at 469.

See: State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P. 2d 1077 (1951),
State v. Virgil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P. 2d 539 (1953), and
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Strite V. Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P. 2d 302 (1944). Most
tests cited by the courts use the words implricate or connect
the defendant and the crime. Applying that test to the
p1·Psent ca'3e, there must be sufficient independent evidence
to implicate or connect Mr. Baran, the appellant, with the
c1·ime of robbing Smith's Independent Gas Station.
The accused is found guilty or innocent, based on the
evidence which connects or implicates him to the crime.
If there is not sufficient evidence to connect and implicate
the accused to the crime, he is free. Utah case law gives
conuete and precise definitions on the amount and type
of evidence needed to corroborate the accomplice's testimony.
In State v. Petralia, 118 Utah 171, 221 P. 2d 873
( 1950), Petralia, along with three others, was accused of
grand larceny. One of the accused confessed and implicated Petralia. The lower court found Petralia gurilty and
he appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah claiming insufficient evidence of corroboration of the testimony of an
admitted accomplice under Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-8
(1953). The Supreme Court found there was sufficient
independent evidence to connect and implicate Petralia to
the crime and based rit on three findings of evidence:
A police officer testified that he saw the defendant in Ogden on June 24, the night the plans for
the robbery were made, while defendant claimed to be
in California.
1.

2.

Defendant admitted to a third party that he
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was involved in the crime and gave the victim back
some of the money claimed stolen.
3. Defendant's own witness testified that Jefendant had asked someone to testify to seeing him in
California before he was even accused of participation
in the crime.
The independent evidence in the instant case is almost
exactly the same as the Petralia case.
1. Petralia made an excuse to his whereabouts
on the night :t:Jhe robbery was planned. Baran, the defendant in this case, testified that on the night of the
robbery he spentt most the evening from 10 :00 to
12 :20 p.m ..aJt hi':S girl friend's house. Petralia's excuse
was in direct conflici with a police officer's testimony,
- so was Baran's. Baran swore that he was at Westovers from 10 :00-11 :20 p.m. Yet, Police Officer Paul
Rogers testified that he saw 1the
in the Salt
Lake Oity Police Starbion the night of the robbery at
11 :00 p.m., exactly when he was supposed to be over
at Westovers (T. 223).
2. Petralia admitted to a third person that he
had coonmitted the crime. The appellant, in this case,
did exacitly rthe same thing. He told Miss Carmelita
Burke that he and others had committed the robbery.
Baran, like PetraJlia, admitted taking part
the
robbery Ito a third party.
3. Petra:Ua was worried about being convicted of
the crime before he was ever accused. Baran had the
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same reaction and even bet his girl friend $5.00 that
the police would accuse him of the crime - rthen testified in court that he never thought the bet was very
funny (T. 197). Respondent admits the night of the
bet with his girl friend was in doubt - but the fact
that appellant was worried about the police accusiing
him of the crime before he was charged is the important element.
Appellant, ( 1) had a police officer testify exactly
opposite to what his excuse was the night of the robbery,
(2) told a third party that he had committed the crime, and
(3) was worried about being apprehended for the crime
before he was ever accused. This is the same type of independent evidence found in Petralia ,fu.at implicated and
connected Petralia to the crime. The burden of proof under the Petralia decision was met in this case.

In State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407
(1963), defendant was convicted of assault with intent to
commit murder and robbery. He appealed the case on
grounds that there was no corroboration of accomplice's
testimony. The court held there was sufficient independent
evidence to implicwte and connect appellant with the crime
because, appellant ( 1) admitted his presence in ,foe itiown
of Bridgeland alt the time of the incident, (2) a shotgun
and nylon stocking were found along the route taken by the
trio after leaving the scene, and (3) an independent witness testified that the defendant admitted to ihim 'that he
shot a man with a shotgun in Utah.
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Similar independent facts were present in the Baran
case. (1) Two different people testified that Ba,.:::1 w;:::
with the robbers both before and after the crime, (2) a
third party tastified that Baran admitted to her that he
took part in the robbery, and (3) the police found the stolen
wallets along the supposed route of the robbers after the
robbery, plus finding the nylon stockings in the getaway
car.
As held in State v. Petralia, supra, pg. ----·
"Evidence sufficiently corroborated testimony
of accomplice to susita:in conviction of grand larceny." Id. at 876.
The present case also had evidence sufficient to corroborate
the testimony of the accomplice to .sustain the conviction
of robbery.
The a:bove mentioned independent facts would be
enough to convict appellant, but there are other facts which
overwhelmingly indicate appellant's guilt. The appellant
was seen with the two other robbers earlier in the night
(T. 56). The appellant worked at the gas station before
the robbery (T. 60); the manager testified that a person
would have to know something about the cash regi.ster to
get it open (T. 61); they found silk stockings in the stolen
getaway car (T. 65); and Mrs. Rose, an innocent party,
tified that appellant came to her house after the robbery
with money and some stolen wallets he wanted to get rid
of (T. 68, 69). All of these are independent facts which
implicate and connect the appellant to the crime.
T,aJcen together, they ·are more than sufficient to cor-

roborate the accomplice's testinH,llj' and hold appellant
guilty of the crime.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT co.:VIMIT ERROR IN
PERMITTING PROSECUTION TO INT R 0 DUCE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
GUILTY FINDINGS IN A MISDEMEANOR
CASE AND OF OTHER CRIMES.
The appellant is contending that evidence was admitted
at the trial which tended to show that he was guilty of
other crimes. He feels that this evidence was inadmissible
and resulted in prejudicial error. He cites the examples of:
theft of radio, taking of pennies, conspiring to rob a thewtre
and a cafe, stealing a car, and a misdemeanor charge of
destruction of property.
1

Appellant cites several cases which he claims support
his point, but a careful reading shows that at least one of
these cases holds exactly opposite to appellant's point.
State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 274, 114 P. 2d 205 (1941),
which appellant relies on, held:

"* * * and tha!t proof of his commission of
other unconnected crimes must be excluded, is subject to exception permitting proof of identification
of accused, motive, intent, p"lan or knowledge * * *
and to exception permitting showing to be made
that offense charged was part of common scheme
which may include one or more other offenses." Id.
at 278. (Emphasis added.)
Later that same holding was 1affirmed in State v.
Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P. 2d 958, cert. denied, 385
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U.S. 939 (1966) when the court stated:
"Testimony which established that defendant
had embezzled or stolen automobile which he was
driving a,t time of his arrest wa>S relevant to is.su<.:!
of whether defendant had sitanding to object to unlawful search and seizure and also :tended '!Jo show
a scheme or plan assooia:ted with charged crime of
robbery, and such testimony was admissable notwithstanding contention !that lit tended to prove
commission of another unrelated crime." Id. at 960.
The a:lleged crimes brought up in court, except the
misdemea.nor charge, were all part of a common scheme thus, under State v. Kappas and State v. Montayne, supra,
they aTe clearly an exception and therefore admissible in
court.
Appellant has shown no grounds for prejudice. Utah
law indicates thwt crimes which are part of a common
scheme, show intent, plans or knowledge, are exceptions to
the rule of nonadmissibility. All of the crimes appellant
alleged, except a misdemeanor, clearly fall within the exception to the rule and are admissible in court.
The admission of ithe misdemeanor is harmless, and lin
no way could lead a courit to believe i t was prejudicial error
againsJt the defendant.
1

POINT III.
IF THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
EVIDENCE COMPLAINED OF, IT WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL.
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The general rule is set forth in Section 77-42-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to-wit:
"After hearing an appeal the court must
give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties. If error has been committed, it shall
not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. 'Dhe
court must be satisfied that it haB that effedt before
it is warranted in reversing the judgment."
"Erroneous admission of evidence does not call for reversal of the judgment where the guilt of the accused is
otherwise satisfactorily proved," State v. Cox, 74 Utah
149, 277 P. 972 (1929). "It must be shown ,that the naturail
effect of the error is to do harm and affect the subsitantial
rights of the parties," State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293,
365 P. 2d 798 (1961).
In State v. Lyman, 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340
( 1960), the legislature intended by the statute that cases
should not be reversed unless the alleged error prejudicially
affected the substantial rights of the parties and that prejudice sh'ould not be presumed but must ,be shown. Id. at
342.
We submit that in the instant case the error, iif the
Court determines that such is the case, did not effeot the
substantial rights of ithe party because the guilt of the
accused was ce11ainly satisfactorily proved and the alleged
prejudicial errors would have no effect on the outcome.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
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Appellant claims he was denied a fair and impartial
trial. To support thi·S he lists a vast a1·,·2,y of alleged errors
by the court. However, there are three reaS'ons why appellant's contention that the court committed prejudicial error
was wrong. The first is when appellant states (contrary
to Utah case law), "hardly any of these errors alone would
justify a new trial, but taken together * * * the jury
could not help but have been influenced and prejudiced
* '·' * " Appellant's Brief, pg. 33 (Emphasis added.) In
State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P. 2d 973 (1947), the
court held exactly opposite to what appellant is advocating.
The Court stated:
"Where none of specified en·or relied on by
appellant constitutes reversible error, combination
of such errors does not constitute prejudicial error,
unless some error, in combination with other factors
creates prejudice." Id. at 979. (Emphasis added.)
Appellant has merely stated the errors, showing no
combination with other factors. Under the holding of State
v. Moore, supra, "there was no combination of other factors" and hence rro prejudicial error, thus, giving Baran a
fair and impartial trfa:l.
Secondly, appellant's list of alleged errors are all condusions. He failed to show why the list of errors constituted prejudice. In State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.
388 (1957), the court stated, "The Supreme Court is not
allowed to presume prejudice from mere error." Id. at 392.
Later, in State v. Lyman, 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340
(1960), the court said, "* * * and that prejudice
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should not be presumed but must be shown." Id. at 342.
I, the pr&<Sent case no prejudicial error was shown. The
appellant w1•ote a large lid of conclusions and left it :to
the court to presume prejudice - contrary to Utah law.
Third, none of the alleged errors on their face is sufficient to prove significant 01· sulYstantial prejudice. (See
also Point III of this brief.)
State V. Seymoul', 18 Utah 2d 153, 417 P. 2d 655
(1966) held:

"There should be no dismissal of charge nor
reversal of judgment unless there was significant
failure or abuse of due process of law, or unless
there was error or defect which it could reasonably
be supposed put defendant ait some substantial disadvantage or had substantial prejudicial effect upon
his rights." Id. at 156.
The Utah courts hold that the prejudice must be substantial or significant; most were mere eiTors in court
which every trial is bound to have. As stated in State v.
Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P. 2d 770 (1966) :
"The purpose of the law and of the rules of
procedure is not only to safeguard the rights of an
accused, but also to see that the guilty are brought
to jus1Jice." Id. at 772.
Appellant did not receive a perfect trial - no one has;
however, he did receive a fair and impartial one.
As stated ,in Harvey v. United States, 306 F. 2d 523,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), "A defendant is entiUed
to a fair trial but not a perfect one."
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See also State v. Ingle, 64 Warsh. 2d 491, 392 P. 2d 442
(1964).
Because appellant is arguing a point contmry to Utah
law, stating nothing but conclusions, and allegiing errors
that are not prejudicial on their face, the errors compiJ.Mned of do not constitute violation of defendant's right
to a fair and impartial tl'ial.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS SELECTION OF THE
JURY.
The court foiJilOlwed Utah 'laws and
choosing :bhe jury and therefore was not
selooti!on. S'ection 77-30-18 orf Utaih Code
on what basis a juror can be di•squalified.

procedure when
prejudicial in its
Ann. 1953 states
It reads:

"A particular cause for challenge is : ( 1) For
such bias as, when tthe existence of the facts is ascertained, in judgment of law disqualified the
juror, and which is known in this Code as implied
bias.
"(2) For the existence of a state of mind on
the part of the juror which
to a juist inference
in reference to the ,case ithat he will not act with
entire impartiality, wMch is known in this Code as
actual bias."
Under this code section rthere must be some type of
l»as to disqualify a juror.
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The judge in examining the jury was very explicit in
rletermining whether or not each of the potential jury membus was biased. On several occasions he a1sked the jury
whether or not they were biased. On no occasion did any
juror indicate they were biased.
Appellianrt puts great stress on the fact that eight of rthe
potential jurors had been robbed; one W::l.'.S a neighbor of
appellant's wife, and two of them had read about apJ)€1lant's prior case. Of the final eight members of the jury,
the neighbor of appellant's w:ife was omitted, and f,ive of ithe
eight that had been robbed were omitted. Of the three on
the jury who had been robbed, one robbery happened ten
years ago, and another was not actually robbed - it ,was
her husband's store which had been robbed. Only one of
the two which had read about the pf!ior caS'e was on the
jury. All eight of those selected indicated in the affirmative that they were in no way biased against the Appellant.
Utah case law points out that there is no bias if each
juror states he is impartial and will rtry defendant according to instructions. In State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175
P. 2d 724 ( 1946) , the court held :
"On trial of information charging conspiracy

to induce others to practice polygamous or plural

marriages, charge of bias on part of members of
Mormon church called to serve on the jury were
not substantiated, where ea:ch said that he would
try case according to the evidence and court's instructions. Nor could defendant object to jurors
who had knowledge that said defendants had been
excommunicated from Mormon church for advocat-
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ing or practicing polygamy, where such info1·mation
was conveyed to jury by their own attorneys." Id.
at 738.
In State v. Convey, 23 Wash. 2d 539, 161 P. 2d 442
(1945), there was no prejudice or bias found even when
a juror told a third party before trial that he did not like
the accused and seemed very antagonistic towards him.
The court held:
"Where prospective juror testified on preliminary examination that his acquaintance with ac·cused or his family would not weigh with juror and
that he knew no reason why he could not act as fair
and impartial juror, whereupon he was passed by
accused's counsel for cause, affidavit that such
juror told affiant before trial that juror did not
like accused and seemed very antagonistic to him
was insufficient to entitle accused to new trial, in
absence of any suggestion in record that such juror
was influenced in his verdict by any prejudice
against accused." Id. at 446.
The lower court judge did everything necessary to
insure a fair and unbiased jury. As indicated by statute
and case law, appellant has no grounds to allege the jury
was prejudicial - on the contrary, all past law indicates
and affirms appellant, Mr. Baran, had a fair and impartial
jury.

CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the conviction Slhould be affirmed. The appellant, Mr. Baran, had a
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fair trial, the conviction was rendered by an imparitial and
jury, and rthe evidence supports the finding. Based
on cases cited and reasoning herein of the a:bove statemenlts,
the lower court conviiction should be upheld.
Respeotfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
.Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant
Attorney Genera:!

Attorneys for Respondent

